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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Gaylord Jay Colvin (Jay Colvin) was arrested for Driving While 
Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI) in violation of Section 18-8004 of the Idaho 
Code. He was stopped for failing to signal when two lanes merged into one while 
he continued to travel in the right lane, an alleged violation of Section 49-808 of 
the Idaho Code. (R., pp. 7-11) 
The stop was based solely upon the alleged violation of Section 49-808 of 
the Idaho Code (R., p. 9) which statute is unconstitutionally void because it failed 
to provide fair notice that signaling is required when roadway design results in two 
lanes down to one and that same section is unconstitutionally void as applied 
because it fails to establish minimum guidelines as to what is an "appropriate 
signal" to govern enforcement of the statute. 
Jay Colvin caused to be filed several pretrial motions, pertinent for purposes 
of this appeal was a Motion to Suppress based upon application of Article 1 
Sections 13 and 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho as well as the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution to the United States of America (R., pp. 
52-53). 
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On January 28, 2013, at a little before 10:30 p.m. Idaho State Trooper 
Jeffory Talbott stopped a vehicle operated by Jay Colvin (Tr. P.8 11. 5-7) 
The sole basis supplied by Talbott was: "As I was behind the pickup, it 
appeared to be weaving in its lane and traveling 30 miles per hour (mph) in the 
posted 35 MPH zone. The pickup then activated its right hand tum signal and 
moved into the right hand lane as we passed a traffic sign indicating the right hand 
lane was ending. The pickup continued south and merged back to the left in front 
of me without signaling. I activated my vehicle's overhead emergency 
equipment ... ". (R., p. 9) 
All of the foregoing appears on video from the "dash cam" video in Talbot's 
patrol vehicle and fails to support any contention of weaving. (Defendant's Exhibit 
A) (Tr. P. 7 11. 19-20). Further testimony was adduced that indicated the vehicle 
operated by Jay Colvin was an older model small pickup and would not go up 5th 
Street Grade (location of the stop) any faster than 30 mph which is why Jay Colvin 
pulled over to the right (actually changed lanes with a signal) to let the car behind 
him (Talbott) pass, and Talbott chose not to pass. (Tr. P. 33 11. 3-1 0) 
There is evidence showing that no discernible leftward movement or motion 
is required for a vehicle to continue straight forward down 5th street. Further that 
no "tum" is required. (Hearing Exhibits A and C) (Tr. P. 35 L. 4- P. 40 L. 20) 
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As background regarding the prelude to the stop of Jay Colvin, Officer 
Talbott testified he had followed and/or observed the Colvin vehicle for 
approximately four ( 4) miles and through the following discourse between counsel 
and Officer Talbott during the suppression hearing offered the following: 
Q. And would you tell me if there's anything in that probable 
cause affidavit indicating that the vehicle was travelling at 30 
miles an hour in a 35-mile-an-hour speed zone? 
A. No. 
Q. And is there anything in that probable cause affidavit 
indicating that you had followed that vehicle through three turns 
and four miles? 
A. Would have been two turns and four miles, but no. 
Q. Well, it turned out on 21st Street-- from gth to 21st, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then it turned off of21 st onto where? 
A. It was either 16th or 19th Avenue. 
Q. And then it turned off of 19th onto sth - - or whatever the - -
17th, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That's three turns. 
A. You said when I followed it. It - - as I was following it, it 
only made two turns. 
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Q. You observed it making three turns? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It doesn't say anything in that affidavit about that, does it? 
A. No. 
Q. The only thing it says in that affidavit is you stopped the 
vehicle for failure to - - failure to signal when merging, correct? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr. P.l2 L.22- P.l3 L. 25) 
After having followed Jay Colvin for the approximate four miles and 
observing three different turns with no apparent illegality Officer Talbott can be 
heard on Defendant's Exhibit A stating at the time of initiating the stop: "Didn't 
signal". 
4 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
SECTION 49-808( 1) OF THE IDAHO CODE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID 
As a starting point the entire case must be filtered by consideration of the 
following: 
"Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). 
Limited investigatory detentions are pennissible when justified 
by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. State v. Bishop, 146 
Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "Reasonable 
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the 
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Id. 
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." I d. (quoting United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, (1989)). The test for reasonable 
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to 
the officer at or before the time of the stop. I d. 
Statev. Morgan, 154Idaho 109, 112,294P.3d 1121, 1124(2013) 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with 
sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited" and that it be "worded in a manner that does not allow 
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arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711 
69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). 
Therefore, a statute is void for vagueness if it "fail[ s] to provide fair notice 
that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or fail[s] to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute. 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. The statute involved in this 
matter, I. C. § 49-808( 1) is unconstitutionally void for both reasons. 
A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague m all of its 
applications," i.e. invalid in toto. However, even if a statute is not facially vague 
it may still be vague "as applied" to a particular defendant's conduct. State v. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. 
Section 49-808( 1) of the Idaho Code states: 
No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle 
right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a 
highway unless and until the movement can be made with 
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton v. State, 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 
933, 935 (Ct.App. 2010) in construing said statute under remarkably similar 
circumstances to these of the case at bar states: 
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Due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not 
be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Smith v. 
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 
612 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 
(1998). Accordingly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, premised 
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requires that a statute defining criminal conduct or imposing civil 
sanctions[ fn 1] be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and 
the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99, 102 S.Ct. 
1186, 1192-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 3 70-72 ( 1982); State v. Korsen, 
138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 
Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App. 2009). Thus, a statute may 
be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of 
ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it 
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or 
others who must enforce the statute. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 
P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14. 
The court continues and holds: 
This vagueness in application occurs because the statute does not 
specify how much or what type of movement to the left or right is 
necessary to trigger the duty to signal. Admittedly, a very literal 
interpretation of the statute might lead to a conclusion that a signal is 
required when two lanes simply merge because a driver in either lane 
must move the steering wheel at least slightly in order to steer into the 
emerging lane. But the statute cannot reasonably be given an utterly 
literal application to every type of side-to-side movement, for a 
vehicle literally moves to the left or the right when a driver weaves a 
bit within his or her lane or simply negotiates a bend in the road, but 
no one would contend that a signal is required in those instances. It is 
simply not apparent from the language of Section 49-808( 1) whether a 
signal is required when two lanes blend into one. Persons of ordinary 
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intelligence can only guess at the statute's directive in this 
circumstance. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to Burton's conduct. 
Because Section 49-808( 1) could not be constitutionally applied to 
her, Burton has shown that no legal cause existed to effectuate the 
traffic stop that led to her breath tests. 
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho at 749-750, 240 P.3d at 936-937. 
Obviously, the Burton holding overruled State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 
971 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999) under circumstances herein. The Burton court 
stated: 
This Court addressed a related but distinct issue in State v. Dewbre, 133 
Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Ct.App. 1999). The driver there contended that 
the signal requirement defined in Section 49-808 did not apply where a 
two-lane portion of a highway ended and two traffic signs as well as 
painted arrows on the highway advised motorists that the right lane was 
ending and traffic should merge left. The Dewbre case generated a 
separate opinion from each of the three Court of Appeals judges. The 
lead opinion stated that the signal requirement applied in that 
circumstance. A second judge concurred in that result but did not join in 
the lead opinion's reasoning, and the third judge dissented. The Dewbre 
opinion does not have precedential value bearing upon the present case 
for several reasons. First, the Court in Dewbre was not called upon to 
address the constitutional issue presented here. Second, there was no 
opinion that commanded a majority, and third, Dewbre is factually 
distinguishable because in Dewbre, road signs and arrows on the roadway 
informed motorists that the right-hand lane was ending and that traffic 
must merge into the surviving, left-hand lane. In the present case, there is 
no evidence of such signage or other indicator that one lane was ending 
and the other surviving. 
Burton v. State, 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.2d at 936. 
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The crucial element is some distinct movement left or right prior to the 
requirement of a signal. The position of Jay Colvin is no distinct movement herein 
was required, and application of the Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code is void 
for vagueness to the circumstances of the case. 
Section 49-808 of the Idaho Code was last amended by the legislature in 
2005. The Burton decision came down in 2010. The legislature has been in 
session four times since and has done nothing to clarifY or remediate the statute's 
infirmity. One must assume the legislature has at least impliedly placed its seal of 
approval on the Burton, interpretation. 
While being required to signal if weaving within a lane or swerving to avoid 
a deer, are situations that stretch the imagination, going around a bend in the road 
is not. Proceeding forward on a road that makes anywhere from a 45° to 90° tum is 
not. Proceeding through the roundabouts that seem to be more and more in vogue 
is not. In fact, signaling in these latter situations could actually constitute a hazard. 
Passing lanes often begin on inclines so slower traffic can stay right. The 
passing lane then expires at the crest of a grade, where both lanes become one. 
Thus, it is the lanes that merge and not the driver. It is preposterous to think that a 
vehicle proceeding forward to the right of a passing lane, who remains in that lane 
throughout (and may even be passed by other cars) needs to signal to lawfully 
9 
continue moving forward. In the present case, Jay Colvin was proceeding down a 
three lane road, moved to the right-hand lane and continued in that lane, never 
changing direction, exiting or merging. 
Further, because the term "appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho 
Code, a person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal is 
appropriate and, therefore, required. The vagueness doctrine does not require 
every word in a criminal statute to be statutorily defined. State v. Casano, 140 
Idaho 461, 464 95 P.3d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2004). However, "a statute must be 
construed so that effect is given to every word and clause of the statute" and 
"words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage 
of the language." State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 665, 991 P.2d 388, 390 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Therefore, effect must be given to the word "appropriate" as it is used 
in this statute. 
"Appropriate" is defined as "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, 
person, occasion" (http://www.dictionary.com, accessed July 23, 2014) or 
"suitable for the occasion or circumstances" (http://www.encarta.msn.com, 
accessed Oct. 15, 2009). Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the 
statute implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not 
appropriate. However, because the statute provides no definition of the term 
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"appropriate signal," (e.g. when other traffic is present and your "movement" 
could impede or interfere with their "movement"), people of ordinary intelligence 
are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. In fact, there are many situations, 
including the one presently before the court, in which "the appropriate signal under 
the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all." 
Jay Colvin was traveling in the right-hand lane of a road that narrowed from 
three lanes to two. Therefore, the design of the road forced Jay to continue 
forward in the same direction without turning as the two lanes became one. While 
the lanes merged (in a manner of speaking), Jay Colvin no more merged or 
changed lanes by remaining in the right-hand side than someone in the left-hand 
lane in the same place may have merged or changed lanes. Thus, it becomes an 
issue of who (in the two lanes) becomes the merger, changes direction or changes 
lanes. The result would actually require parties in both lanes to signal. Hence, one 
could envision a situation where a driver in the left-hand lane would signal a right-
hand tum and a driver in the left-hand lane would signal to tum left, even though 
both continued in the same direction with neither turning. 
There was no other traffic in the vicinity at the time whose travel was 
potentially impeded or interfered with by Jay Colvin's action. Therefore, it is 
likely that the "appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal at all. However, 
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because the statute fails to provide notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
whether the terms "movement" and "appropriate signal" include such situations, it 
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this situation and, therefore, void. 
B. 
SECTION 49-808(1) OF THE IDAHO CODE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE AS APPLIED TO THIS CASE BECAUSE IT FAILS TO 
PROVIDE SUFFICIENT GUIDELINES AS TO WHEN A SIGNAL IS 
APPROPRIATE THEREBY GIVING POLICE UNBRIDLED DISCRETION IN 
ENFORCING THE STATUTE. 
A law that does not provide minimal guidelines for enforcement 
"impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 586, 798 
P.2d 43, 45 (1990). This failure to provide minimal guidelines for enforcement is 
often "what tolls the death knell" for a statute. !d. at n. 4. This is "perhaps the 
most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine." !d. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 
415 u.s. 566, 574 (1974). 
In Bitt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing to 
provide sufficient enforcement guidelines. State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho at 590, 798 
P.2d at 49. Under the ordinance, a person could not be arrested or convicted 
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unless he failed to identify himself and offer an explanation for his presence and 
conduct. !d. However, the ordinance did not provide any guidelines for what 
constituted credible and reliable identification and, therefore, gave police officers 
complete discretion to make that determination. !d. at 589-590. Although that 
ordinance was found to be facially void, the reasoning is equally applicable in this 
"as applied" vagueness challenge. 
Section 49-808(1) of the Idaho Code's use ofthe phrase "appropriate signal" 
without providing further enforcement guidelines impermissibly gives officers 
complete discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute. 
Although a facial challenge of Section 49-808( I) of the Idaho Code may not 
prevail because there are obvious situations in which a person of ordinary 
intelligence would understand a signal to be appropriate, the statute is vague as 
applied to Jay Colvin's conduct herein. 
As discussed above, there are many situations in which a signal is not 
necessary. Not only does the statute's failure in defining the phrase "appropriate 
signal" leave a person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a signal is 
"appropriate," this failure to provide minimal guidelines provides police with 
unbridled discretion in determining whether the statute has been violated. 
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Therefore, Section 49-808( 1) of the Idaho Code is unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to Jay Colvin because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as to when a 
signal is appropriate thereby giving police officers unbridled discretion in 
enforcing the statute. 
c. 
SUPPRESSION IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY HEREIN. 
The State has raised the spectre the Order of Suppression is not appropriate 
under the circumstances herein. They cite federal authority for that proposition 
(1\1ichigan v. Defillippo, 443 US 31 (1979)). The United States Supreme Court in 
that case relies on the concept of "good faith" reliance upon an ordinance in 
effectuating a stop which had not yet been ruled unconstitutional. It is the position 
of Jay Colvin application of that ruling is not appropriate to the case herein. 
The statute in question had already been ruled unconstitutional in Burton v. 
State, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010). Therefore the argument 
Officer Talbott was relying in "good faith" on a statute is inapplicable since it had 
already been ruled unconstitutionally vague. 
The concept of good faith, although perhaps in somewhat different 
circumstances has not been used by this court as an exception to exclusion of 
evidence. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012); State v. Reesman, 
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122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992). The suppression motion herein relied upon 
United States Constitution as well as the State Constitution. Use of "good faith" is 
not appropriate to the case at bar. 
The state is raising for the first time on appeal an issue not raised below. It 
has long been the ruling of the appellate courts in Idaho that issues not raised 
below will not be considered on appeal. State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 334, 208 
P.3d 734, 738, (Ct. App. 2009): State v. Hedge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d, 123, 
126 (1992). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated above, Gaylord Jay Colvin respectfully asks this 
Court to uphold Judge Kerrick's Order and order the suppression of any evidence 
obtained as a result of the unlawful stop and/or seizure of Gaylord Jay Colvin. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of July, 2014. 
CHAPMAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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